Saturday, January 4, 2014

Excerpts On "Liberalism" From The Great Explainer

   As I talk to various folks, I keep being struck by the reversal of the meaning of liberalism from its historical context.  It's almost lost any meaningful meaning except as a punching-bag for conservative pundits (Rush Limbaugh has mastered the art of teasing "liberals" who deny that they are liberals).  Apparently the ideology of the commercial world is now associated with the German Idealists who birthed Communist Russia and other totalitarian states.  Its modern counterpart, conservatism, as a philosophy and not just a virtue, seems to be much younger and has borrowed much from old-school liberalism.  In the spirit of those "disinterested men" who founded our nation, and were expected to continue leading it, I seek for a useful fusion of the two.  Reading Bertrand Russell's "A History of Western Philosophy" has been quite a task but reveals much of the evolution of these ideas.  So here is Russell's  perspective on liberalism, written as WWII was coming to a close and the world was again re-inventing itself.


   "Before embarking upon any detail, it will be well to consider the general pattern of the liberal movements from the 17th to the 19th century.  This pattern is at first simple, but grows gradually more and more complex.  The distinctive character of the whole movement is, in a certain wide sense, individualism; but this is a vague term until further defined.  The philosophers of Greece, down to and including Aristotle, were not individualists in the sense in which I wish to use the term.  They thought of man as essentially a member of a community; Plato's Republic, for example, is concerned to define the good community, not the good individual.  With the loss of political liberty from the time of Alexander onwards, individualism developed, and was represented by the Cynics and Stoics.  According to the Stoic philosophy, a man could live a good life in no matter what social circumstances.  This was also the view of Christianity, especially before it acquired control of the state.  But in the Middle Ages, while mystics kept alive the original individualistic trends in Christian ethics, the outlook of most men, including the majority of philosophers, was dominated by a firm synthesis of dogma, law, and custom, which caused men's theoretical beliefs and practical morality to be controlled by a social institution, namely the Catholic Church: what was true and what was good was to be ascertained, not by solitary thought, but by the collective wisdom of Councils.
   
   "The first important breach in this system was made by Protestantism, which asserted that General Councils may err.  To determine the truth thus became no longer a social but an individual enterprise.  Since different individuals reached different conclusions, the result was strife, and theological decisions were sought, no longer in assemblies of bishops, but on the battle-field.  Since neither party was able to extirpate the other, it became evident, in the end, that a method must be found of reconciling intellectual and ethical individualism with ordered social life.  This was one of the main problems which early liberalism attempted to solve.
   
   "Meanwhile, individualism had penetrated into philosophy.  Descartes' fundamental certainty, "I think, therefore I am," made the basis of knowledge different for each person, since for each the starting-point was his own existence, not that of other individuals or of the community.  His emphasis upon the reliability of clear and distinct ideas tended in the same direction, since it is by introspection that we think we discover whether our ideas are clear and distinct.  Most philosophy since Descartes has had this intellectually individualistic aspect in a greater or lesser degree.
   
   "There are, however, various forms of this general position, which have, in practice, very different consequences.  The outlook of the typical scientific discoverer has perhaps the smallest dose of individualism.  When he arrives at a new theory, he does so solely because it seems right to him; he does not bow to authority, for, if he did, he would continue to accept the theories of his predecessors.  At the same time, his appeal is to generally received canons of truth, and he hopes to persuade other men, not by his authority, but by arguments which are convincing to them as individuals.  In science, any clash between the individual and society is in essence transitory, since men of science, broadly speaking, all accept the same intellectual standards, and therefore debate and investigation usually produces agreement in the end.  This, however, is a modern development; in the time of Galileo, the authority of Aristotle and the church was still considered at least as cogent as the evidence of the senses.  This shows how the element of individualism in scientific method, though not prominent, is nevertheless essential.
   
   "Early liberalism was individualistic in intellectual matters, and also in economics, but was not emotionally or ethically self-assertive.  This form of liberalism dominated the English 18th century, the founders of the American Constitution, and the French encyclopedists.  During the French Revolution, it was represented by the more moderate parties, but with their extermination it disappeared for a generation from French politics.  In England, after the Napoleanic wars, it again became influential with the rise of the Benthamites and the Manchester School.  It's greatest success has been in America, where, unhampered by feudalism and a State Church, it has been dominant from 1776 to the present day, or at any rate to 1933.
   
   "A new movement, which has gradually developed from the antithesis of liberalism, begins with Rousseau, and acquires strength from the Romantic movement and the principles of nationality.  In this movement, individualism is extended from the intellectual sphere to that of the passions, and the anarchic aspects of individualism are made explicit.  The cult of the hero, as developed by Carlyle and Nietzsche, is typical of this philosophy.  Various elements were combine in it.  There was a dislike of early industrialism, hatred of the ugliness it produced, and revulsion against its cruelties.  There was a nostalgia for the Middle Ages, which were idealized owing to hatred of the modern world.  There was an attempt to combine championship of the fading privileges of Church and aristocracy with defense of wage-earners against the tyranny of manufacturers.  There was a vehement assertion of the right of rebellion in the name of nationalism, and of the splendor of war in defense of "liberty."  Byron was the poet of this movement; Fitch, Carlyle, and Nietzsche were its philosophers.

   "But since we cannot all have the career of heroic leaders, and cannot all make our individual will prevail, this philosophy, like all other forms of anarchism, inevitably leads, when adopted, to the despotic government of the most successful "hero."  And when his tyranny is established, he will suppress in others the self-assertive ethic by which he has risen to power.  This whole theory of life, therefore, is self-refuting, in the sense that its adoption in practice leads to the realization of something utterly different: a dictatorial State in which the individual is severely oppressed.

  "There is yet another philosophy which, in the main, is an offshoot of liberalism, namely that of Marx, I shall consider him at a later stage, but for the moment he is merely to be borne in mind.

  "The first comprehensive statement of liberal philosophy is to be found in Locke, the most influential though by no means the most profound of modern philosophers.  In England, his views were so completely in harmony with those of most intelligent men that it is difficult to trace their influence except in theoretical philosophy; in France, on the other hand, where they led to an opposition to the existing regime in practice and to the prevailing Cartesianism in theory, they clearly had a considerable effect in shaping the course of events.  This is an example of a general principle: a philosophy developed in a politically and economically advanced country, which is, in its birthplace, little more than a system of clarification and systematization of prevalent opinion, may become elsewhere a source of revolutionary ardour, and ultimately of actual revolution.  It is mainly through theorists that the maxims regulating the policy of advanced countries become known to less advanced countries.  In the advanced countries, practice inspires theory; in the others, theory inspires practice.  This difference is one of the reason why transplanted ideas are seldom so successful as they were in their native soil."
   ...

   "The great political defect of Locke and his disciples, from a modern point of view, was their worship of property.  But those who criticized them on this account often did so in the interests of classes that were more harmful than the capitalists, such as monarchists, aristocrats, and militarists.  The aristocratic landowner, whose income comes to him without effort and in accordance with immemorial custom, does not think of himself as a money-grubber, and is not so thought of by men who do not look below the picturesque surface.  The business man, on the contrary, is engaged in the conscious pursuit of wealth, and while his activities were more or less novel they roused a resentment not felt towards the gentlemanly exactions of the landowner.  That is to say, this was the case with middle-class writers and those who read them; it was not the case with the peasants, as appeared in the French and Russian Revolutions.  But peasants are inarticulate.

   "Most of the opponents of Locke's school had an admiration for war, as being heroic and involving a contempt for comfort and ease.  Those who adopted a utilitarian ethic, on the contrary, tended to regard most wars as folly.  This, again, at least in the 19th century, brought them into alliance with the capitalists, who disliked wars because they interfered with trade.  The capitalist's motive was, of course, pure self-interest, but it led to views more consonant with the general interest than those of militarists and their literary supporters.  The attitude of capitalists to war, it is true, has fluctuated.  England's wars of the 18th century, except the American war, were on the whole profitable, and were supported by business men; but throughout the 19th century, until its last years, they favoured peace.  In modern times, big business, everywhere, has come into such intimate relations with the national State that the situation is greatly changed.  But even now, both in England and in America, big business on the whole dislikes war.

   "Enlightened self-interest is, of course, not the loftiest of motives, but those who decry it often substitute, by accident or design, motives which are much worse, such as hatred, envy, and love of power.  On the whole, the school which owed its origins to Locke, and which preached enlightened self-interest, did more to increase human happiness, and less to increase human misery, than was done by the schools which despised it in the name of heroism and self-sacrifice.  I do not forget the horrors of early industrialism, but these, after all, were mitigated within the system.  And I set against them Russian serfdom, the evils of war and its aftermath of fear and hatred, and the inevitable obscurantism of those who attempt to preserve ancient systems that have lost their vitality."

   ...

   "The romantic movement, in art, in literature, and in politics, is bound up with [a] subjective way of judging men, not as members of a community, but as aesthetically delightful objects of contemplation.  Tigers are more beautiful than sheep, but we prefer them behind bars.  The typical romantic removes the bars and enjoys the magnificent leaps with which the tiger annihilates the sheep.  He exhorts men to imagine themselves tigers, and when he succeeds the results are not wholly pleasant.

   "Against the more insane forms of subjectivism in modern times there have been various reactions.  First, a half-way compromise philosophy, the doctrine of liberalism, which attempted to assign the respective spheres of government and the individual.  This begins, in its modern form, with Locke, who is as much opposed to "enthusiasm" -the individualism of the Anabaptists- as to absolute authority and blind subservience to tradition.  A more thoroughgoing revolt leads to the doctrine of State worship, which assigns to the State the position that Catholics gave to the Church, or even, sometimes, to God.  Hobbes, Rousseau, and Hegel represent different phases of this theory, and their doctrines are embodied practically in Cromwell, Napoleon, and modern Germany.  Communism, in theory, is far removed from such philosophies, but is driven, in practice, to a type of community very similar to that which results from State worship.

   "Throughout this long development, from 600 B.C. to the present day, philosophers have been divided between those who wished to tighten social bonds and those who wished to relax them.  With this difference others have been associated.  The disciplinarians have advocated some system of dogma, either old or new, and have therefore been compelled to be, in greater or lesser degree, hostile to science, since their dogmas could not be proved empirically.  They have almost invariably taught that happiness is not the good, but that "nobility" or "heroism" is to be preferred.  They have had a sympathy with the irrational parts of human nature, since they have felt reason to be inimical to social cohesion.  The libertarians, on the other hand, with the exception of the extreme anarchists, have tended to be scientific, utilitarian, rationalistic, hostile to violent passions, and enemies of all the more profound forms of religion.  This conflict existed in Greece before the rise of what we recognize as philosophy, and is already quite explicit in the earliest Greek thought.  In changing forms, it has persisted down to the present day, and no doubt will persist for many ages to come.

   "It is clear that each party to the dispute -as to all that persist through long periods of time- is partly right and partly wrong.  Social cohesion is a necessity, and mankind has never yet succeeded in enforcing cohesion by merely rational arguments.  Every community is exposed to two opposite dangers: ossification through too much discipline and reverence for tradition, on the one hand; on the other hand, dissolution, or subjection to foreign conquest, through the growth of an individualism and personal independence that makes co-operation impossible.  In general, important civilizations start with a rigid and superstitious system, gradually relaxed, and leading, at a certain stage, to a period of brilliant genius, while the good of the old tradition remains and the evil inherent in its dissolution has not yet developed.  But as the evil unfolds, it leads to anarchy, thence, inevitably, to a new tyranny, producing a new synthesis secured by a new system of doctrine.  The doctrine of liberalism is an attempt to escape from this endless oscillation.  The essence of liberalism is an attempt to secure a social order not based on irrational dogma, and insuring stability without involving more restraints than are necessary for the preservation of the community.  Whether this attempt can succeed only the future can determine."

    -Russell

No comments:

Post a Comment