Ruminations On The Centennial Of The Great War

      As the 100yr anniversary of WWI nears we can be sure to hear all the familiar platitudes about Americans defending freedom against aggression from our domestic media. Other nations will have plenty of cum laudes to heap upon themselves and everyone agrees that there is a wealth of personal heroism and sacrifice to celebrate. This is about all that the involved nations agree upon as they each have their own ideas of what exactly caused this dreadful conflict and who we can blame for it. It is somewhat incredible that such a vitally important event (many even blame it for WWII) could still after all these years defy explanation. It seems obvious that the main impediment to finding common ground is the continued necessity of using the Great War to support nationalistic narratives that have become essential to political ideologies. Untangling these threads is essential to understanding what went wrong with civilization and how to stop anything like it from happening again.
      A short piece in the WSJ illustrated some of the problems in setting down a comprehensive narrative that all the nations participating in the commemoration can agree upon, although they have all concurred that the message should be one of European “friendship and unity.” Serbians don't want to accept their share of the blame, Flanders is showboating to gain credentials as a principality worthy of independence, Germany is supposedly ignoring the event (I can't imagine why), Bosnian nationalists are praising Ferdinan's assassin as a hero, and the British have an internal struggle over whether to lionize or excoriate their generals. The succession of events that lead to the worst conflict ever seen on the planet are notoriously complex and many of the volatile issues then remain so now. Let us try and use the occasion to make explicit what the key factors were, politically, technologically, and psychologically. It may be that this inquiry is just as relevant today as it was 100 years ago. We would like to believe that this sort of thing can no longer happen on such a brutal scale, looking perhaps to the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) as a nuclear shield. Though it seems to be unlikely that any rational leader would initiate such a conflict, this certitude is no reason to become mentally lethargic and not seek other solutions, especially if we want to see a nuke-free planet.
On the technological advances that made WWI possible there is a wide concurrence of opinion. German military successes against France in the 1800s made it apparent that strategic changes would have to be made in any country that wanted to have a chance on the modern battlefield. Regarding the new German tactics Carroll Quigley writes: “ Moltke's great contribution was to be found in the fact that, by using the railroad and the telegraph, he was able to merge mobilization and attack into a single operation so that the final concentration of his forces took place in the enemy country, practically on the battlefield itself, just before contact with the main enemy forces took place.” In the age of mass armies the side that could launch an offensive on the partially-mobilized forces of the foe would have a clear advantage. Mobilization became practically equivalent to invasion and the ability to move from a state of armed crisis back to peace was hampered by the limits of communications and the necessity for detailed plans of an offensive nature. Echoes of this problem can be seen in today's headlines with NATO crying foul-play over Russian military exercises near the Ukrainian border in Europe, while in Asia North Korea complains about the stress the South's maneuvers are placing on their own army. In today's world a military training exercise can be turned into an offensive, resulting in armies training for war against each other at the same time on the same border; in the pre-1914 world this would not have been possible without actual invasions taking place since they lacked the flexibility of modern forces.

     Alliances evolved to reflect the dangerous state of affairs. With offensive action holding such a prominent place in their playbooks the signal for one nation to mobilize meant that all their allies also began to carry out their own offensive mobilizations. Quigley again: “It encouraged extremism, because a country with allies would be bolder than a country with no allies, and because allies in the long run did not act to restrain one another.” The vital alliances could only be maintained by giving wholehearted military support to one conflict or another, eventually this support was bound to be forthcoming at a synchronistic moment, as it did in 1914, even if political solutions were available.
     Another aggravating factor was the mass-media's new role in democratic regimes. Nationalistic feeling combined with cut-throat politics to hand election victories to demagogues of violence who displayed no qualities of dithering weakness for their domestic rivals to harp on. There were also increasing numbers of topics for discord among nations that had to become politically involved in commerce to compete in a global economy. Technologically, economically and politically humankind was obviously at its apex, but the great achievement of humanity were turning ugly and no one could agree why. Industrialization had already produced massive gains for the urbanites while it penetrated and destroyed localized old-school economies. The idealism of the previous century had whet the appetite of the industrialized world to reap the benefits that technology could offer in dominating the undeveloped world; in particular the rise of Germany and her attempt to establish colonies was destructive to the balance of power. Between the rise of Germany as an economic powerhouse, the fall of the Ottoman system, and the new economic perogatives in foreign policy; the tensions became more and more polarizing. Eventually France and Britain decided to work out their colonial differences so that France could focus on German power at home while the British could try and stamp out the emerging naval and colonial power of the Germans. Thus were the lines drawn.

     The cumulative psychological impact of the many changes facing the world had a poisonous effect on leadership. War seemed so inevitable that the real question was only “when?” As Quigley says, “The success of Bizmark's policy of 'blood and iron' tended to justify the use of force and intimidation in international affairs, and to distort the role of diplomacy so that the old type of diplomacy began to disappear. Instead of a discussion between gentlemen to find a workable solution, diplomacy became an effort to show the opposition how strong one was in... Metternich's old definition, that 'a diplomat was a man who never permitted himself the pleasure of a triumph,' became lost completely.” The prevailing mood of diplomatic “desperation” caused leaders to value a strong first-strike on an unprepared enemy to become more tempting than working things out at the conference table, since war would come what may.

     Any person's analysis of what exactly was the chief problem in this period says a lot about what their particular world-view happens to be. The world before the war can be compared to the ida of a “state of nature” of early political theory. Exactly what this state of nature was before political activity began determines the proper role of the state in the present. If we believe that this natural state was one of brutal conflict we shall accept the rule of a monarch as a lesser evil as Hobbes said. If we are nostalgic for nature, as Locke was, then the government must take on a minimalist approach. In the current discussion, whatever problems lead to WWI will most likely be blamed for present ills too. Did global capitalism reach the point of kill or be killed? Did bankers hijack the policies of England? Was it actually a manifestation of racial hatreds or religious differences?

     My own opinion tends towards 'all of the above” in this case. I think that historical analyses generally miss the mark by emphasizing one influence too highly over all the others. The flaw with the world-view that tries to minimize the faults to one specific area or another is that they do not grasp the full complexity of the developed world at that stage. Rather than looking at pre-war times as a less-developed stage of civilization I would argue that the world has in some ways been in stasis. The problems that led to the first world war are the same problems we face today, more or less. The 1800s were more modern than we usually realize and closer to today than we like to admit. Much of the technological foundation for modernity was already well-established even if it existed side-by-side with almost medieval ways of life. The rapid growth of American industry in the last century disguises this fact for U.S. Americans; we haven't been witness to the slow but steady displacement of the donkey by the car, rather we had the post-war capital at hand to rapidly achieve first-world living conditions.

      To see an illustration of what I mean look at the sequential rapidity of the two world wars. Although Europe was ravaged and progress was immeasurably retarded by the destruction that began in 1914 and the ensuing recession, we can still see that the standard of living in 1930s Europe was relatively advanced. That France and Germany were both able to generate massive military machines in such a short time speaks volumes about pre-war conditions. The relevant period of technological growth is quite long, but our appreciation of it is distorted by the fact that we undervalue 19^th century technology even though it was extremely effective.

     The “Agricultural Revolution” is one such technological development of great significance for understanding today's economic and political system. The ability to produce food for urban dwellers with a smaller agricultural labor force had several major impacts other than simply “allowing” cities to grow; along with specialization of the educated classes was a despecialization of the rural communities who had used their personal talents for subsidiary incomes. The new proletariat was not just unskilled people, it was also people whose skills were no longer needed. Pressured by lower commodity prices and mass-produced goods, the farmers could not hold on to what land they had gained since serfdom ended. The countries that had a longer period of time to evolve a skilled non-serf farmer handi-crafter class were the ones that gained the most capital from the concentration (or re-concentration) of land as the exodus to the cities intensified. Germany is a partial exception because they happened to have a knack for machines and the Jewish communities were a ripe fruit for liquidation into war-capital.

     New divisions of land created new societal problems in each country that followed a model of westernization. There is no such thing as a farm-owner (or serf) not having anything to do, but now machines had created legions of unemployed. One way to alleviate this is by colonizing, but the more practical solution is usually to find foreign markets for surplus goods. The London-based exchange network was extremely effective at balancing out trade deficits, but in the end the deflationary trend of the gold-standard caused recurrent banking crises. Quigley explains:
     “Another paradox of banking practice arose from the fact that bankers, who loved deflation, often acted in an inflationary manner from their eagerness to lend money at interest. Since they make money out of loans, they are eager to increase the amount of bank credit on loan. But this is inflationary. The conflict between the deflationary ideas and inflationary practices of bankers had profound repercussions on business. The bankers made loans to business so that the volume of money increased faster than the increase in goods. The result was inflation. When this became clearly noticeable, the bankers would flee to notes or specie by curtailing credit and raising discount rates. This was beneficial to bankers in the short run (since it allowed them to foreclose on collateral held for loans), but it could be disastrous to them in the long run (by forcing the value of the collateral below the amount of the loans it secured). But such bankers' deflation was destructive to business and industry in the short run as well as the long run,”

     The inevitable reaction to the increasingly unstable cycles of finance was nostalgia for the past; this manifested in nationalism, a sort of prequel to the idealization of pre-WWI days in the modern era. While we bicker in the present about what made life so great before the calamity of war shattered it, at the turn of the century the debate over “what went wrong” had a more geographical character. No one could say precisely why they thought things had been better before the small-timers were liquidated into capital for industrial investment; however that may be, there was a mistrust of technology and a reversion to racial idealization. If only the border of the state could return to the glory days and racial unity restored the good times would come again. This retreat into semi-racist ideology seems repugnant and illogical to we who were raised on slogans of “Never Again,” but in reality it is only another permutation of the attempt to understand why technological progress is not the boon we think it should be. Although the Romantic ethos survives where nationalism has (hopefully) fallen, the general revolt against modernity has common origins with our own societies struggle to come to grips with the prosperity and catastrophe of the last 200 years or so. Nationalism sought to reassert the individual by creating a closed sphere of blood-tied citizens who could fulfill their egoistic self-interest in common, this paradox being supposedly smoothed over by vague notions of racial harmony.

      This closed system resembles the dream of the U.S.S.R. and other socialist republics that believed they could realize their Utopia within the relatively closed circle of the revolutionary regimes, or at least that they could survive and thrive just long enough for the “rot” to spread to other barrels. But the communists were driven to this isolation by the victory of fascism in some countries and Anglo-American capitalism (or both) in others, both being by-products of nationalism. The original international communist movement was another attempt to make sense of history as a class struggle with a predictable trajectory that required industrialization so that the machines would grind down the cost of labor to virtually nothing. They were aware that the Romantics were aristocratic in nature and that their revolt against reason would only lead to a new formulation of capitalism with a totalitarian flavor. The capitalism that was produced had much in common with socialism, it was not based on conventional economic rules and did provide relief for the underclasses; this was seen as a way to preserve what was good from the past while improving it with controlled technology.

     The application of technology was a more contentious subject then than it is today (outside of hippy circles), it created divisions among classes that we tend to think of a being normally allied. The trade-unions had been invested in slowing the pace of technological implementation for years. They recognized that their specialized skills, which set them apart from low-wage laborers, would no longer matter if the gadgets were allowed to replace human skill as the most important factor in production. Set against the trade-unions (the petit bourgois) was the communist movement; they were the creation of the concentration of land ownership and the natural desire of business to drive down labor costs through competition for unskilled jobs. The concept of universal solidarity between skilled and unskilled labor was producing international organizations at odds with “national socialism,” the veneer of fascism. These anarchists and communists were sometimes quite violent and raised the fear of chaos in pre-war Europe at a time when statesmen should have been fearing organized warfare more. The Spanish Civil War even brought England into naval actions against the anarchists on the side of fascism, elucidating one of the reasons fascism was able to take hold int he first place: the Western Democracies were willing to tolerate it as long as its violence was directed against the frightening forces of populist organization.
     For centuries political thinkers had developed various philosophies with the intention of showing how the “state of nature” in which man interacted with other men sans the law, was properly replaced by a “social contract” of various forms depending on which type of government was favored by the philosopher. They all seemed to admit that the state of nature was better overall than the state of civilization, but the goal was to prove that law was a necessary evil. Whether or not humans ever did exist without some kind of government, and what this existence looked like, was conceded to be a mystery, but it was clear that once government did arise there would be no choice for communities other than to form one themselves in order to have efficient self-defense. This is the most common complaint leveled against the Spanish anarchists: their disorganization was such a detriment to the war against Franco that the Communist/Liberal government had to fight them first before they could launch a reasonable assault. They also hoped for aid from France or Britain seeing as they had a common foe, but they did not properly estimate the degree to which they themselves were a common foe as well. If the anarchists had not been betrayed and had won their war it would have caused not just political upheaval, but also philosophical realignment. Only strong modern states were supposed to be able to fight other strong modern states, without this justification who knows how far anarchism might have spread?

     The fall of Russia to revolutionaries during WWI has a similar influence in the basic world-view as passed down to us today. Thus embarked an era of experimentation in rationalistic communism as a solution to the system that had created such wars and modern nightmares. Whether this experiment or the US American experiment is the way to go has no been determined by force of arms yet, but the possibility of a sequel to the Great Wars is the backdrop psychologically of any attempt to understand the past or the future. As long as Mutual Assured Destruction is maintained we don't have to worry about that eventuality too much, energy can instead be focused into fixing the real issues that made WWI (and II by default) practically inevitable. Although the details have changed, the tendencies that made peace difficult can be observed in today's economics and politics. I have to recommend both Quigley's Tragedy and Hope and Russell's A History of Western Philosophy to get a sense of some of the issues that are recurring a hundred years later.  Both men wrote based on their experience of living through the periods, Russell during the 2nd War; maybe this is why his arguments for a world government are so compelling.

Just Ask An Native American About It

Cass Sunstein long ago wrote piece on conspiracy theories that I was immediately interested in reading after finding a short description of it on infowars (a misleading one).  Obama’s former “Information Czar” was in charge of regulating all sorts of diverse functions which have fallen under the oversight of the Federal Government , so many that it is likely his job was more theoretical and advisory than managerial.  A part of his credentials for this post is presumably his mildly (I hope) influential paper titled Conspiracy Theories that was composed for The University of Chicago Law School.  It had an effect on the vernacular, bringing the “echo chamber” description of conspiracy culture into vogue, but the influence on the actual field of conspiracy theory is negligible.  The reason for this is stated in his definition of axioms defining his field of discussion as conspiracy theories targeting “powerful” people that are also false and harmful:

                 

           ‘Our focus throughout is on false conspiracy theories, not true ones.  Our ultimate goal is to explore how public officials might undermine such theories , and as a general rule, true accounts should not be undermined… Within the set of false conspiracy theories we limit our focus to potentially harmful theories.  Not all conspiracy theories are harmful, consider the false conspiracy theory held by many of the younger member of our society, [spoiler alert] that a secret group of elves, working in a remote location under the leader ship of the mysterious “Santa Claus,” make and distribute presents on Christmas Eve.’

                We may question Cass’s parenting skills, but it's certain he makes an ideological weapon of choice to whatever government he wishes to offer his services.  Assuming the opposite scope to his in truth value, the true conspiracy theory may be combated in the same way as the false, although he admits that one “should not” do so “in general.”  Since the goal of tainting an unwelcome theory is the same either way, what a government should do with his excellent advice is quite irrelevant.  To illustrate. Let us make the thought experiment of Cass as a servant of a different ruling power: Great Britian under King George III.  What would his response have been upon receiving this missive:

            ‘When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands… a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.  We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal…  That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it...  prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes…  but when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.”

            That's quite the conspiracy you’ve got there Jefferson, I can the Czar exclaiming!  Then he would go on to lecture Franklin on his credulity in assigning so much importance to the desires of powerful men rather than the vagaries of fate.  We’re taking it for granted that he kept his position and did not obey the “general rule” that true conspiracy theories out not to be contradicted,  perhaps to save his head.  It would be futile to respond that he has far too much irrational faith in the ability of randomness and chaos to shape events rather than the goals of the powerful men.  This point of view is ruled out axiomatically despite the evidence, essentially making his analysis of this specific conspiracy useless as far as gaining knowledge is concerned.  That is not his function, rather he is to be used without volition as a tarnishing brush.  That does not stop us from learning from the lessons of the paper, it just limits how much we can learn. 
           
         For instance, let us examine the first option he would pose to George III for damage control: simply ignore them.  This is a convenient position for one who doesn’t care about the truth of a charge since he obviously can’t argue from his true axiomatic line of reasoning publicly.  Also, due to the “echo chamber” effect, it is usually pointless to advance a defense of the government.  No matter what one says, there will always be another voice “echoing” the charge back again, bouncing off the conspiracy theorists forums on the docks and appearing to give validity to the crazed speculations.  In essence, the conspiracy theorists are a “sealed” social unit who will reinforce each other’s paranoia no matter how delusional it becomes.  The description sounds familiar, indeed it applies to the rebel colonies and plenty of other social units that do not come under the description of “false, harmful conspiracy theorists.”  It appears to be an observation pertaining to all human social units, to one degree or another.  Still, it does no good to echo the “echo chamber” back into Cass’s face, because he cannot be swayed by empirical arguments and must hold to the party line.  This makes the “echo chamber,” as he uses it, mostly useless for discussing the real topic, giving no more information about conspiracy theorists than any other people.  It is however a fine ideological dart to throw around without having to explicitly deny anything.  For these reasons the first option is likely the best one for George to avoid any public accounting of him or other guilty parties.

            In second place comes holding a press conference in response to the charges.  It is taken for granted that the response is a denial.  If there be whistleblowers they must be crushed, discredited, or disembowled.  The only considerations for Cass are the psychological flaws of the soon-to-be founding fathers, who fail to place chaos at the pinnacle of causation where it belongs:

            “Conspiracy theorists display the characteristic features of a 'degenerating research program' in which contrary evidence is explained away by adding epicycles and resisting falsification of key tenets…  [They] also believe that there are conspirators deliberately attempting to plant evidence that would falsify the conspiracy theory…  The self-sealing quality of conspiracy theories creates serious problems for government.  Direct attempts to dispel the theory can usually be folded into the theory itself as just one more play by powerful machinators to cover their tracks.”

            Unfortunately, the odds of amelioration are low, although a possible mitigating factor that is not mentioned is transparency.  Conspiracies are criminal acts and must be shielded from discovery, thus a government that hides its involvement in the act or conducts a classified investigation naturally draws suspicion unto itself.  Smoke=fire, and the American Patriots are not “irrational” per-se to draw that conclusion, or any conclusion based on wrong information.  Their beliefs are irrational from the point of view of those who have superior knowledge (this is discussed in the paper using the Justified True Belief definition), if the Crown of England is innocent of conspiracy, but from the perspective of ignorance the “extreme” view that there is a cover-up going on makes sense.  Again, there is little we can use of this view that is not already self-evident, in this case limited by definition to a certain scope.  The formulation is useful to the propaganda aims of England though, imparting a aura of paternal annoyance at a naïve child, who would see the error of his ways if only the veil of secrecy so necessary to a sovereign could be parted.  Those poor Yankees with their “crippled epistemology,” apparently that of empirical induction if we are to take their little bit of hemp paper seriously.  It harkens us back to the child, if we will, so fervently faithful that Santa will carry-out his conspiracy once again this year, while the older siblings and parents smile in the background with lips necessarily sealed.  Why shouldn’t he believe in Santa?  Everyone else does?
            Alas, for this bairn of mother England is not just deluded, but dangerous, by definition; he is also a threat in quite the same way as a rattle-snake that “fears you more than you fear it.”  The child thinks it has grown into a man and wants independence now, clearly unacceptable to the imperial interest.  Sadly, the Crown must turn to the third and desperate option remaining and do exactly what the colonists are expecting in their sealed echo-chamber, of paranoiac, crippled epistemology: George must call up the conspirators and attempt to plant evidence that would falsify the conspiracy theory.  This might entail taking covert advantage of “conspiracy cascades,” the method through which beliefs are spread among the ignorant masses.  It starts with one confident person (Andrew) who is a good liar or actually believes in the declaration; he states his belief in the charges, in the hearing of another member, Barnes.  To the text:

“[Barnes] now knows Andrew’s judgment; she should certainly go along with Andrew’s account if she independently agrees with him.  But if her independent judgment is otherwise, she would –if she trusts Andrew no more or less than herself- be indifferent about what to do, and she might simply flip a coin.  [Assuming the coin agrees with Andrew] now turn to a third person, Charleton… unless Charleton thinks his own information is better than theirs he should follow their lead.  If he does, Charleton is in a cascade.”

Thus, with the flip of a coin, all the certainty that King George is a bumbling fool who exists at the whims of random forces is thrown out the window in favor of the wild theory that the Monarch is pursuing some rational self-interest.  We need not reflect that this sort of  “cascade” probably exists in some form in all information systems and media, if we limit our scope to the confines comfortable to a professional sophist.  We need only to disrupt the cascade through installing agents apparently friendly to the rebels.  At that crucial “coin-flip” moment the agent can come in with an innocuous suggestion of some fact that might cause us to doubt ‘Andrew’s” expertise.  With a little luck the cascade can be turned on its head and headed back into the imperial fold.  Of course, it’s much more complicated than all that and sophisticated studies of wedge-issue along with professional data-mining can now be used to isolate “group polarization,” that bosom friend of extremism.  I quote:

“For purposes of understanding the spread of conspiracy theories, it is especially important to note that group polarization is particularly likely, and particularly pronounced, when people have a shared sense of identity and are connected by bonds of solidarity.  These are circumstances in which arguments by outsiders, unconnected with the group, will lack credibility, and fail to have much of an effect in reducing polarization.”

Thus, secrecy is necessary and covert penetration into the group.  The main fear “with the tactic of anonymous participation, conversely, is that if the tactic becomes known, any true member of the relevant group who raises doubts may be suspected of government involvement.” It’s kind of like telling the kid about the Tooth Fairy; they might have their doubts about Santa too.  Cass does not advocate lying to the groups or planting false theories, as Alex Jones and friends seem to think, but for the reasons already mentioned this is not a practical comfort.  Suffice to say, what a government should do with these psychological warfare tactics and what they will do may be quite distinct.  These ideas of social control are hardly new and the novel aspect is in the guidelines to which they are applied.  Machiavelli had plenty to tell the Medici family about dividing and conquering and Cass merely follows in the footsteps of the master.  

Machiavelli, in his eagerness to find favor with the hostile Medicis, was writing for his life and made no pretensions whatsoever that a Prince would survive without pretensions.  In those times, as today, it was not enough to foil the conspiratorial plots, one had to birth and hatch one’s own more rapidly and with less warning than the enemy.  It has long been recognized, from Machiavelli to Madison, that the greatest danger to the well-stocked and thick-walled city is a secret door opened in the night.  Students of Greek history all, the fratricidal lessons learned in the democratic/oligarchic struggles of Athens were a profound factor in early American distrust of actual democracy.  Who knows?  If Alcibiades had just lost a couple more horse-races, he might have conquered Syracuse instead of going over to the Spartan side under duress.  One wants ones friends with them at the front lines, but you can’t leave too many enemies behind.  But the street-smarts of Machiavelli’s Principe is translated into the bland semantics that seem to be Cass’s particular genius.  Behaviorism is a tough school to write within and the Czar is apt enough to find a backdoor through which to discuss beliefs without truth value in the Justified True Belief theory of knowledge.  I’ll let that pass though, due to my crippled epistemology, no doubt.

Passing forward in time from Greece , but not yet to the time of the Founders, we may analyze another real-world example from U.S. American history and imagine what they might have done given Machiavelli’s guidance.  Too bad for the Haudenoshaunee that they knew not a word of Italian (or is it Latin?) for they might have avoided the traps of their enemies with some conspiracy theorizing.  Although any of the coastal tribes could have easily repelled the first touching of civilizations they did not, apparently willing to submit the growing tensions to “natural causes” rather than a conspiratorial invasion of a hostile race.  Cass would certainly have applauded their wisdom in not sticking to the extremist views, the bugbear of their solidarity and communal identity.  For many, these qualities were soon gone completely (with extinction) or nearly so. 

Still, the Haudenoshaunee Federation was easily powerful enough to crush the white-man’s power and end the threat at least for a while.  The English made use of option #2 and forged treaties, denying any intention of destroying their peace, offering trade and gifts and disease, and generally buying time.  The Indians felt secure in their possessions until it was too late, after all they had an empire.  They were adept at beating the white man at his own technological game and had farms and houses that the whites envied.  Most importantly they were blood of the land, bound to their powerful comrades with old ties, even more able to subjugate the other native peoples with their new arms, and most importantly, tactically supreme in the endless “wastes” that surrounded them.  The French and English had to live under the threat of a pre-dawn ambush by thousands of braves who could cross impossible distances on foot in the night. 

According to the local lore of the Onondagada, Syracuse (NY) was taken by a singularly devious conspiracy, though perhaps only temporarily.  The story is apocryphal, but so it goes:  The valleys were too swampy and filled with mosquito to hold during the steamy hot Summer and so the people lived on the hills in the breeze.  When the breeze got sharp in the Winter they would pack it up to the valley where they could stay cozy and slide around on the ice, but then one year the Yankees had occupied the hills and so they were weakened by malaria in the valley all Summer.  The Patriot army was pissed because they tried to mark a militia across Onondaga Hill Park (as it was called back then) and were ambushed and routed badly.  The retaliation was harsh after the revolution.  If that story may not be literally true, you’ll discover it’s true enough in any city when deciding to buy a house on the hill or not. 

By the time the Five Nations were at their peak they had made enemies and grabbed territory all around, but without damaging the French all that much.  The French had plenty of allies to lead them into the forest, Huron, Algonquin, Lenape, Mahican, ect.  When the colonists turned on them it was no longer a beneficial fight with the English against just France and their brave allies.  The alliances shifted and the trap closed.

I wonder, had they a book -on-tape copy of Principe would that have changed anything?  All that was really needed was to cut French lines of supply and convert the weaker tribes instead of just taking their land, assuming that would be at all possible in those days.  The Golden Rule of the Prince is to appear good as much as possible, for the purpose of using others against your enemies.  The British and their love of trade mastered the principle in their own way.  They were fine allies for the Nations, but they were also way overextended.  The key was with the colonists, if they had defeated the French first the formation of the U.S. would have been checked and the Western line held for some time.  That failure may have had something to do with Georgie’s annoyance with them and their suspicions that he wanted to weaken their power, which he did. If the American Indians do remember their past then it's understandable that the Grandmothers, the Keepers of the Seed, are concerned about a trangenic patent colonization in the realm of DNA that could rob them of their land and their seeds in one fell swoop.  The stakes have never been higher nor the alleged conspiracy more sinister.

This case here, with budding America playing the democrat to the English oligarch and opening the gates to the French so to speak, is just another sordid example of how intertwined politics get with conspiracies.  I believe that some theories are correct and some are not, but it’s hard to know which.  I’m skeptical of the official truth in a lot more cases than I think I know the truth.  Cass hits on a lot of good ideas in his own way, I could see his insights being valuable to someone in power for sure.   

I would go into the legal side of it, but it’s a little bit like parsing The Watchtower.  The truth and the moral and legal actions of leadership are too vital to the subject to gloss over.  Why watch the Cass movie when you could read the Machiaveli book?  But how indeed do we think we know the truth?  How does anyone know the whole truth?  If there is a massive conspiracy of schizophrenic proportions then I think it’s sort of pointless to battle too much over specifics, to “polarize” as they say.  Subversive theories are dangerous, but they can also be useful to state actors.  A police-state welcomes these divisions in society and seeks to nurture the extremist element, subtly putting the struggle more and more into the battlefield where they can try out their new toys.  I define extremism, at unhealthy levels, as being unable to apply the principles you apply to yourselves to other humans.  If we dig deep into the Conspiracy we may find that we are all in on it too.

Excerpts On "Liberalism" From The Great Explainer

   As I talk to various folks, I keep being struck by the reversal of the meaning of liberalism from its historical context.  It's almost lost any meaningful meaning except as a punching-bag for conservative pundits (Rush Limbaugh has mastered the art of teasing "liberals" who deny that they are liberals).  Apparently the ideology of the commercial world is now associated with the German Idealists who birthed Communist Russia and other totalitarian states.  Its modern counterpart, conservatism, as a philosophy and not just a virtue, seems to be much younger and has borrowed much from old-school liberalism.  In the spirit of those "disinterested men" who founded our nation, and were expected to continue leading it, I seek for a useful fusion of the two.  Reading Bertrand Russell's "A History of Western Philosophy" has been quite a task but reveals much of the evolution of these ideas.  So here is Russell's  perspective on liberalism, written as WWII was coming to a close and the world was again re-inventing itself.


   "Before embarking upon any detail, it will be well to consider the general pattern of the liberal movements from the 17th to the 19th century.  This pattern is at first simple, but grows gradually more and more complex.  The distinctive character of the whole movement is, in a certain wide sense, individualism; but this is a vague term until further defined.  The philosophers of Greece, down to and including Aristotle, were not individualists in the sense in which I wish to use the term.  They thought of man as essentially a member of a community; Plato's Republic, for example, is concerned to define the good community, not the good individual.  With the loss of political liberty from the time of Alexander onwards, individualism developed, and was represented by the Cynics and Stoics.  According to the Stoic philosophy, a man could live a good life in no matter what social circumstances.  This was also the view of Christianity, especially before it acquired control of the state.  But in the Middle Ages, while mystics kept alive the original individualistic trends in Christian ethics, the outlook of most men, including the majority of philosophers, was dominated by a firm synthesis of dogma, law, and custom, which caused men's theoretical beliefs and practical morality to be controlled by a social institution, namely the Catholic Church: what was true and what was good was to be ascertained, not by solitary thought, but by the collective wisdom of Councils.
   
   "The first important breach in this system was made by Protestantism, which asserted that General Councils may err.  To determine the truth thus became no longer a social but an individual enterprise.  Since different individuals reached different conclusions, the result was strife, and theological decisions were sought, no longer in assemblies of bishops, but on the battle-field.  Since neither party was able to extirpate the other, it became evident, in the end, that a method must be found of reconciling intellectual and ethical individualism with ordered social life.  This was one of the main problems which early liberalism attempted to solve.
   
   "Meanwhile, individualism had penetrated into philosophy.  Descartes' fundamental certainty, "I think, therefore I am," made the basis of knowledge different for each person, since for each the starting-point was his own existence, not that of other individuals or of the community.  His emphasis upon the reliability of clear and distinct ideas tended in the same direction, since it is by introspection that we think we discover whether our ideas are clear and distinct.  Most philosophy since Descartes has had this intellectually individualistic aspect in a greater or lesser degree.
   
   "There are, however, various forms of this general position, which have, in practice, very different consequences.  The outlook of the typical scientific discoverer has perhaps the smallest dose of individualism.  When he arrives at a new theory, he does so solely because it seems right to him; he does not bow to authority, for, if he did, he would continue to accept the theories of his predecessors.  At the same time, his appeal is to generally received canons of truth, and he hopes to persuade other men, not by his authority, but by arguments which are convincing to them as individuals.  In science, any clash between the individual and society is in essence transitory, since men of science, broadly speaking, all accept the same intellectual standards, and therefore debate and investigation usually produces agreement in the end.  This, however, is a modern development; in the time of Galileo, the authority of Aristotle and the church was still considered at least as cogent as the evidence of the senses.  This shows how the element of individualism in scientific method, though not prominent, is nevertheless essential.
   
   "Early liberalism was individualistic in intellectual matters, and also in economics, but was not emotionally or ethically self-assertive.  This form of liberalism dominated the English 18th century, the founders of the American Constitution, and the French encyclopedists.  During the French Revolution, it was represented by the more moderate parties, but with their extermination it disappeared for a generation from French politics.  In England, after the Napoleanic wars, it again became influential with the rise of the Benthamites and the Manchester School.  It's greatest success has been in America, where, unhampered by feudalism and a State Church, it has been dominant from 1776 to the present day, or at any rate to 1933.
   
   "A new movement, which has gradually developed from the antithesis of liberalism, begins with Rousseau, and acquires strength from the Romantic movement and the principles of nationality.  In this movement, individualism is extended from the intellectual sphere to that of the passions, and the anarchic aspects of individualism are made explicit.  The cult of the hero, as developed by Carlyle and Nietzsche, is typical of this philosophy.  Various elements were combine in it.  There was a dislike of early industrialism, hatred of the ugliness it produced, and revulsion against its cruelties.  There was a nostalgia for the Middle Ages, which were idealized owing to hatred of the modern world.  There was an attempt to combine championship of the fading privileges of Church and aristocracy with defense of wage-earners against the tyranny of manufacturers.  There was a vehement assertion of the right of rebellion in the name of nationalism, and of the splendor of war in defense of "liberty."  Byron was the poet of this movement; Fitch, Carlyle, and Nietzsche were its philosophers.

   "But since we cannot all have the career of heroic leaders, and cannot all make our individual will prevail, this philosophy, like all other forms of anarchism, inevitably leads, when adopted, to the despotic government of the most successful "hero."  And when his tyranny is established, he will suppress in others the self-assertive ethic by which he has risen to power.  This whole theory of life, therefore, is self-refuting, in the sense that its adoption in practice leads to the realization of something utterly different: a dictatorial State in which the individual is severely oppressed.

  "There is yet another philosophy which, in the main, is an offshoot of liberalism, namely that of Marx, I shall consider him at a later stage, but for the moment he is merely to be borne in mind.

  "The first comprehensive statement of liberal philosophy is to be found in Locke, the most influential though by no means the most profound of modern philosophers.  In England, his views were so completely in harmony with those of most intelligent men that it is difficult to trace their influence except in theoretical philosophy; in France, on the other hand, where they led to an opposition to the existing regime in practice and to the prevailing Cartesianism in theory, they clearly had a considerable effect in shaping the course of events.  This is an example of a general principle: a philosophy developed in a politically and economically advanced country, which is, in its birthplace, little more than a system of clarification and systematization of prevalent opinion, may become elsewhere a source of revolutionary ardour, and ultimately of actual revolution.  It is mainly through theorists that the maxims regulating the policy of advanced countries become known to less advanced countries.  In the advanced countries, practice inspires theory; in the others, theory inspires practice.  This difference is one of the reason why transplanted ideas are seldom so successful as they were in their native soil."
   ...

   "The great political defect of Locke and his disciples, from a modern point of view, was their worship of property.  But those who criticized them on this account often did so in the interests of classes that were more harmful than the capitalists, such as monarchists, aristocrats, and militarists.  The aristocratic landowner, whose income comes to him without effort and in accordance with immemorial custom, does not think of himself as a money-grubber, and is not so thought of by men who do not look below the picturesque surface.  The business man, on the contrary, is engaged in the conscious pursuit of wealth, and while his activities were more or less novel they roused a resentment not felt towards the gentlemanly exactions of the landowner.  That is to say, this was the case with middle-class writers and those who read them; it was not the case with the peasants, as appeared in the French and Russian Revolutions.  But peasants are inarticulate.

   "Most of the opponents of Locke's school had an admiration for war, as being heroic and involving a contempt for comfort and ease.  Those who adopted a utilitarian ethic, on the contrary, tended to regard most wars as folly.  This, again, at least in the 19th century, brought them into alliance with the capitalists, who disliked wars because they interfered with trade.  The capitalist's motive was, of course, pure self-interest, but it led to views more consonant with the general interest than those of militarists and their literary supporters.  The attitude of capitalists to war, it is true, has fluctuated.  England's wars of the 18th century, except the American war, were on the whole profitable, and were supported by business men; but throughout the 19th century, until its last years, they favoured peace.  In modern times, big business, everywhere, has come into such intimate relations with the national State that the situation is greatly changed.  But even now, both in England and in America, big business on the whole dislikes war.

   "Enlightened self-interest is, of course, not the loftiest of motives, but those who decry it often substitute, by accident or design, motives which are much worse, such as hatred, envy, and love of power.  On the whole, the school which owed its origins to Locke, and which preached enlightened self-interest, did more to increase human happiness, and less to increase human misery, than was done by the schools which despised it in the name of heroism and self-sacrifice.  I do not forget the horrors of early industrialism, but these, after all, were mitigated within the system.  And I set against them Russian serfdom, the evils of war and its aftermath of fear and hatred, and the inevitable obscurantism of those who attempt to preserve ancient systems that have lost their vitality."

   ...

   "The romantic movement, in art, in literature, and in politics, is bound up with [a] subjective way of judging men, not as members of a community, but as aesthetically delightful objects of contemplation.  Tigers are more beautiful than sheep, but we prefer them behind bars.  The typical romantic removes the bars and enjoys the magnificent leaps with which the tiger annihilates the sheep.  He exhorts men to imagine themselves tigers, and when he succeeds the results are not wholly pleasant.

   "Against the more insane forms of subjectivism in modern times there have been various reactions.  First, a half-way compromise philosophy, the doctrine of liberalism, which attempted to assign the respective spheres of government and the individual.  This begins, in its modern form, with Locke, who is as much opposed to "enthusiasm" -the individualism of the Anabaptists- as to absolute authority and blind subservience to tradition.  A more thoroughgoing revolt leads to the doctrine of State worship, which assigns to the State the position that Catholics gave to the Church, or even, sometimes, to God.  Hobbes, Rousseau, and Hegel represent different phases of this theory, and their doctrines are embodied practically in Cromwell, Napoleon, and modern Germany.  Communism, in theory, is far removed from such philosophies, but is driven, in practice, to a type of community very similar to that which results from State worship.

   "Throughout this long development, from 600 B.C. to the present day, philosophers have been divided between those who wished to tighten social bonds and those who wished to relax them.  With this difference others have been associated.  The disciplinarians have advocated some system of dogma, either old or new, and have therefore been compelled to be, in greater or lesser degree, hostile to science, since their dogmas could not be proved empirically.  They have almost invariably taught that happiness is not the good, but that "nobility" or "heroism" is to be preferred.  They have had a sympathy with the irrational parts of human nature, since they have felt reason to be inimical to social cohesion.  The libertarians, on the other hand, with the exception of the extreme anarchists, have tended to be scientific, utilitarian, rationalistic, hostile to violent passions, and enemies of all the more profound forms of religion.  This conflict existed in Greece before the rise of what we recognize as philosophy, and is already quite explicit in the earliest Greek thought.  In changing forms, it has persisted down to the present day, and no doubt will persist for many ages to come.

   "It is clear that each party to the dispute -as to all that persist through long periods of time- is partly right and partly wrong.  Social cohesion is a necessity, and mankind has never yet succeeded in enforcing cohesion by merely rational arguments.  Every community is exposed to two opposite dangers: ossification through too much discipline and reverence for tradition, on the one hand; on the other hand, dissolution, or subjection to foreign conquest, through the growth of an individualism and personal independence that makes co-operation impossible.  In general, important civilizations start with a rigid and superstitious system, gradually relaxed, and leading, at a certain stage, to a period of brilliant genius, while the good of the old tradition remains and the evil inherent in its dissolution has not yet developed.  But as the evil unfolds, it leads to anarchy, thence, inevitably, to a new tyranny, producing a new synthesis secured by a new system of doctrine.  The doctrine of liberalism is an attempt to escape from this endless oscillation.  The essence of liberalism is an attempt to secure a social order not based on irrational dogma, and insuring stability without involving more restraints than are necessary for the preservation of the community.  Whether this attempt can succeed only the future can determine."

    -Russell

speculations about gun-control

   In my ruminations on gun-control I tend to scan the history of the subject quite a lot more than the present.  One reason for this is that I don't own a gun and I'm not very afraid of dying by one.  One day I would like to hunt boar or deer and I would consider owning one for protection if I had much to protect in the way of family and property and lived far from any police patrols or in the ghetto.  It is comforting to have the option to own a gun, but I'm not one of those types that is prepared for a civil conflict and arming himself.  One reason for this is that, if such a conflict were to occur in the near future, I have no doubt some group would have extras lying around and recruit me.  If it comes down to just me and my arsenal surrounded by nefarious foes then I won't have a chance anyhow.
   So much for the turbulent possibilities of the future, what about the threat of being shot tomorrow?  The possibility seems slim, remote enough to not disturb my peace of mind.  If I am shot I imagine it would be because the police got the wrong house or otherwise made some error in the line of duty, this being an subject I will touch later.  The other source of danger is gang-drug violence and I lived in Syracuse long enough to know how to avoid that threat, or a crazed gunman.  I estimate a low statistical probability of my being shot tomorrow and so I am relatively disinterested on the topic.
   Not everyone has that luxury.  The noble rhetoric of gun-control is based on protecting the people that do live in fear of gun violence: inhabitants of the ghetto and I suppose anyone who goes to a school, mall, ect.  The former deserve consideration, the latter I am going to dismiss as an aberration that is unlikely enough at present to ignore.  We have to find a way to halt the trend, of course,  but the solution is unknown and the issues involved are basically opaque due to the taboo of the subject.  The violence of the ghetto is on a vast scale compared to the random shooters and I think gun-control advocates are correct to hammer on it.
   Does that mean we should have "gun-free zones" and more aggressive policing?  If those tactics were effective, perhaps.  The problem with the "zone" is that gun stores are all over and so they just seep in from outside.  The only way to stop that flow is through aggressive policing, which I also reject as inefectual.  Worse, a police-state vibe in the ghetto increases the societal isolation, the humiliation of poverty, the eroding of civil liberties, and makes the cop's job impossible in the end.  They can only do their job effectively if they are able to gather information from community members and at present there is a code of silence.  The situation is getting worse by the day and bad-feelings are understandable on all sides of the untenable position.
   Luckily, we can begin to heal that wound immediately by decriminalizing drugs.  In a post-prohibition world the police are only there to respond to community requests for assistance and thus the community will naturally assist those who attempt to assist them.  It won't happen overnight and gun-laws still would provide a rational for the poisonous stop-and-frisk style policing, but a majority of the tension would be released.  With the easing of the rampant imprisonment families might be able to gather steam once more, making the presence of guns in the community no more of a big deal than they are in any suburb.  Having armed citizens makes a cops job easier in a functioning community since it entails a much greater risk to criminal activity.
   This does not, however, resolve the issue of gun-control.  It is called a "wedge-issue" because personal opinions on guns vary so drastically as we would expect in a diversified population.  For anti-gun people it is exacerbated by the sweeping rhetoric of the "gun-nuts" who want fewer and fewer restrictions on constitutional grounds while completely disregarding the legitimate concerns of the urban dwellers who are the ones suffering from violence.  Both political parties make avid use of this split for cynical political reasons.  Their problem is not that they disagree on so much, but that they have to find ways to brand themselves as different from their opponents.  A hot-button issue like guns is the perfect tool to distract from the issues the Big Boys really care about.
   We should not think that the anti-gun camp has no concern for safety and are completely bent on nothing more than disarming the population in order to oppress them.  This might be on the long-term agenda, but i think that it is recognized that it's not very realistic to expect 'Mericans to give up their weapons any time soon.  Hunting and gun-ownership is rife among the elite as well as the hick.  I imagine that the same racism that allows liberals to accept the existence of ghettos also allows them to accept a status-quo of certain populations being allowed arms and others denied them.  Indeed, considering the war on drugs, there is much more incentive to disarm the city than the country.  What the gun lovers fear is exactly what happened to the Black Panther movement and other "gangs," more or less notorious.  With this in mind we may determine that the agenda has already met with it's success and the further restrictions on guns are just "mopping-up."  They can consolidate the success of the war on drugs in destroying Black nationalism by merely restricting ammo and marking the guns so that illegal dealers pay the price for inner-city crime.  
   Onto the wider goals of gun-control we leave the inner-city behind and are faced with an armed rural/suburban population that is often quite hostile to the government.  Would it not naturally proceed to the stage of disarming them and hence eradicating the chance of physical resistance?  I must confess that if I were a politician I would find it a lot easier to apply my agenda, for good or ill, if I was capable of using force.  Although I don't doubt that fantasies of similar types do crop-up in the minds and even conversations of the liberal elite, I don't believe that it is on the top of their to-do list.  For one thing, the wedge-issue is useful and there's no point in taking it away.  For another, they already have the ability to use force against whomever they choose.  In order for the armed populace to defend itself against an organized, efficient, trained, and superlatively armed government they would require a great deal of discipline and organization among themselves.  If they had that discipline and organization they would be capable of not just defeating the powers that be physically, but also politically.          Unless the police-state progresses quite a bit there would be no need to resort to violence to overthrow the government at all.  It is our job to maintain this ability to effect relatively peaceful political change and not be distracted by the saber-rattling about seizing guns.  If we fail the bloodshed could not be less than catastrophic and so armed rebellion should still be considered a last resort.  At least we should realize that it is pointless to throw our lives away one at a time before an organized movement gains strength.  What this movement is based upon remains to be seen, but I don't think that the 2nd amendment is a sufficient banner to rally around. 
   The true danger, the unspoken agenda, of gun-control is not that we will lose our guns: that is yet remote.  The damage will first be done to the constitution itself and not just one amendment of it.  By setting the precedent for legislature to interfere with the 2nd amendment they set a precedent for the entire constitution and what it means to have "rule of law."  The second amendment should naturally be quite close to our hearts, at least in as much as it gives the right to self-defense.  Without this right all the other rights do us no good.  As defenseless beings we tacitly oblige the police to become our life-line and become dependent on them.  This dependence and the precedent of ignoring the constitution are anathema to the system of government we have come to take for granted.  This system of government can only exist when there is a balance; the government must protect us (or our property) for otherwise why should we want it?  On the other hand, if we become entirely dependent on that protection we open ourselves up to manipulation by our defenders.  This is why I see the 2nd amendment not as an anachronism, but as quite relevant for the future and the principles we live under.  
   We must retain responsibility for our actions and not allow any concept of pre-policing to enter into the public mind.  The ban on drugs damages us in the same way by giving the cops responsibility for our well-being even if the drugs haven't done any damage yet.  We will soon be inundated in a level of technology that makes deception itself nearly impossible.  Facial-recognition technology has advanced rapidly and I challenge anyone to be able to look the computer in the lens and lie without detection.  The very electronic devices we use (as well as any metal surface potentially) can detect our bio-electric signature and know exactly who we are.  Quantum computers can read our texts with the level of understanding of an unintelligent police officer or they will soon enough.  Obviously the only protection against this technology is, ironicaly, an ancient document written on hemp.  Thus any policy that attacks the underlying principles of the document attacks the document itself.  For this reason, though i may never own a gun, I am worried about the attacks on the 2nd amendment.  
   All that said, I believe it is time to rewrite that little paragraph so sacred to liberty.  We cannot allow the reigning philosophy in the supreme court to continue to judge not based on the meaning of the text, rather on how it should be written.  The court should not legislate even if the text of the constitution is dated, as I  believe it is.  Taken literally it means that I should have the ability to buy a mortar-launched nuke or a sarin-gas rocket.  They are arms after all?  But this is absurd, I seem to hear a detractor say, there is no way the founding fathers intended that!  No, of course they didn't, they didn't even know that such weapons existed.  They were smart though and they knew that weapons technology would continue to progress and so they made the document mutable through amendment.  In modern times this has meant that the document is mutable through the interference of unelected judges, but we cannot afford to trust a few men when so much is on the line.  We must insist on our constitutional rights to make our own constitutional amendments as well as to hold state constitutional conventions in our more dysfunctional states.
   One naturally wonders what the founders would have thought if they were here today, or perhaps what their foresight assumed a rational populace would decide.  Unfortunately, because of the political instability of the times, we will never be able to know that.  All of the convention debates were held in secret and our sources for their political thinking are second-hand and maybe even disingenuous propaganda (recall how high the stakes were back then).  These are valuable tools, but they are no substitute for the real opinions that came out in private session.  Some of those opinions were anti-American, especially among the delegates of powerful states.  My home state of New York is not called the Empire State for no reason; they were set-up to be a power unto themselves and only joined the Union to avoid being isolated and alone.  It is likely that New York had plans for a conquering army rather than the innocuous "well-ordered militia."  Would they have wanted their citizens armed?  We cannot know.
   It is serendipitous that we do not need to know and that the foundations of the document are based on trust in the future to make the right choices given a disinterested ruling class and a balance of power.  Much was left unsaid that we take for granted as being in there somewhere because of early legal precedent.  Yet legal precedent is not democratic and now divisions appear wherever one looks.  These divisions seem insoluble as though our entire nation is splintering and losing cohesion.  Fears are inevitable of all sorts of conspiracies and all the traditional ills of democracies are evident, faction and strife.  Nevertheless, the declaration of independence is a conspiracy theory itself and the government was a craft designed to weather storms of even greater severity than those they faced.  The key to it all is it's mutability under rule of law and democratic oversight.
   Our vessel is cracked, but not broken.  I have faith that even on our most divisive issues there is a common interest and a common ground.  Although we see a massive reaction of horror to the Sandy Hooks and the Chicagos there are liberals who yet fear the government more.  Transparency when tragedy occurs can alleviate much of the most bitter conflict between the bleeding-hearts and the conspiracy-theorists.  On both sides of the issue we must demand a real investigation of all the shootings, not accepting that the case is closed before it's made.  The paternalism of the state in regard to any violence gun-related should be abhorrent to the whole public on principle, recalling that when investigations are kept secret the state has a free hand in violence.  The extreme emotional resistance, perhaps noble, of the gun-lovers to any infringement on their rights must be tempered by the admittance that we don't exactly know what those rights are.  As it stands today, whenever there is an attack on gun-ownership it forecasts a further attack later and so is resisted to the full.  A constitutional amendment in the clearest possible terms would necessarily limit the technological level of private weaponry, but it would also serve as a shield to all weapons rights that are specified.  In this way we can move to an actual debate of what the reasonable limit of private arms (maybe even public arms too, but that's another one) and make the compromises necessary to any functioning democracy.   It will be easier for both sides to compromise if the compromise can be permanent and not just another policy of another administration that could be reversed in four years.